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I. GENERAL BACKGROUND
'No one can read the significant Supreme Court cases on sovereign
immunity... without concluding that the field is a mass of confusion; and
if he ventures beyond that to attempt some reconciliation of the courts of
appeals decisions, he will find confusion compounded."'
The sovereign immunity doctrine . . . is no longer a healthy
manifestation of society. It is, in fact, an excrescence on the
body of law, it encourages irresponsibility in the world order, it
generates resentments and reprisals. Sovereign immunity is a
stumbling block in the path of good neighborly relations between
nations, it is a sour note in the symphony of international
concord, it is a skeleton in the parliament of progress, it
encourages government toward chicanery, deception and
dishonesty. Sovereign immunity is a colossal effrontery, a
brazen repudiation
of international moral principles, it is a
2
shameless fraud.
The forgoing observations apply exponentially when one considers the
privileges and immunities of International Organizations, and the
impediment that such immunity presents to the real and meaningful reform
of 1Os. In recent years, there has been a litany of press reports recounting
the abject failings of lOs in effecting reform of their internal governance
mechanisms3 (to wit, Oil for Food, United Nations (UN) Procurement
Fraud, sexual abuse of refugee girls by 10 aid workers, UN peacekeepers,
etc).4
The authors hypothesize that such failures result directly from the
immunity afforded 1Os which encourages or at least allows 10 managers
and executives to engage in illegal or unlawful practices which would
otherwise expose them and their organizations to civil or criminal liability
1.

House Report, Pub. L. No. 94-574, 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6121, 6145 (1976).

2.
Chemical Nat. Resources v. Republic of Venezuela, 215 A.2d 864, 893 (1966)
(Musmanno, J., dissenting).
3.
For the latest on failed UN reform measures, see George Russell, Reform is Just a Word at
the
U.N.,
Its
own
Investigation
Shows,
Fox
NEWS,
Oct.
9,
2009,
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,562382,00.html (last visited Jan. 25, 2010).
4.
One of the authors has published a paper which recounts the practical failings of the
current internal justice system followed by most 1Os, and the particularly oppressive effect it has on
international civil servants.
The paper, "LEGAL PROTECTION IN INTERNATIONAL
ORGANISATIONS
FOR
STAFF-A
Practitioner's
View"
can
be
accessed
at
http://tinyurl.com/IOstafflegalprotection. Edward P. Flaherty, Legal Protectionfor Staff in International
Organsations-APractitioner'sView, 2 HUMAN RIGHTS & INT'L LEGAL DISCOURSE BRUSSELS 16-17,
Mar. 2007.
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in national courts there. Absent the threat of criminal sanction or a
substantial civil damages award, the normal incentive of civil society for
managers and executives to run their organizations lawfully and/or in
accord with best practices is non-existent, encouraging rather than
preventing unacceptable behavior within lOs which clearly also has a
negative effect on their performance and effectiveness. The inability of the
scourge of lOs, United States (U.S.) Ambassador to the UN John Bolton
(during his brief tenure at Turtle Bay) to change this troubling culture,
suggests that neither the 1Os themselves nor their Member States are willing
or able to take the steps necessary to effect meaningful reform that will
prevent the reoccurrence of such shameful incidents as Oil for Food and the
sexual abuse of refugee girls.5 The authors believe that this will occur only
if the current immunities afforded to lOs are radically recast as suggested
herein.
Historically, jurisdictional immunities came from a notion of comity
that existed among equal sovereigns, whose actions were not to be judged
by their fellow rulers, unless their express consent was given to it. 6 With
the emergence of nation-states, the concept of jurisdictional immunity was
transferred from the figure of the sovereign to that of the State. In other
words, no State could be subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of another
State. This principle was later codified in several international instruments
and has also been recognized as part of customary international law.
Although the initial explanation justifying the application of this
privilege used to lie in a reciprocal sense of comity, with the passing of time
it was deemed that sovereign immunity served a functional purpose as it
enabled both the State and its agents-especially those working at foreign
locations-to carry on their duties without being hampered by the threat of
being sued in local jurisdictions (and therefore being prevented from
carrying out their functional duties or otherwise being deterred therefrom by
the risk of such suit).
Immunity of foreign States was initially conceived as being absolute
and as such, States could never be compelled to appear as defendants in
Nevertheless, with the boom of international
judicial proceedings.
commercial and investment transactions in the international scenario after
World War II, in which States obviously played an important role, the old
notion of absolute immunity was transformed by the introduction of a
distinction between those acts a State did in its sovereign capacity (de jure
5.
Nile Gardiner, Ph.D., John Bolton: A Force For Change at the UN., THE HERITAGE
at
available
2005,
3,
Aug.
FOUNDATION,
http://www.heritage.org/research/internationalorganizations/wm814.cfin (last visited Feb. 9, 2010).
For a far more detailed survey of sovereign and 10 immunities, please see the paper of our
6.
fellow panelist Dr. Matthew Parish presented simultaneously.
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imperii) and the same State's acts of a commercial nature (de jure
gestionis). While immunity remained for the first category, acts pertaining
to the second one no longer granted the State immunity from judicial
processes in other States' courts.
Following this logic, a State could not be sued for having committed
an armed invasion in pursuance of its own interests, but it would no longer
be immune from suit for having incurred in a breach of a commercial
contract with a foreign private entity. This is what is known as restrictive
immunity, in contrast to the previous absolute notion.
II. IMMUNITY OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
The immunity granted to lOs comes from the foreign sovereign
immunities tradition mentioned above. However, it is justified by a theory
of "functional necessity," which came into being after World War II, when
emerging 1Os needed support from the States in order to achieve a certain
degree of maturity and therefore to be able to perform their duties in an
unfettered manner. This kind of immunity was based on the idea that it
would serve the best interests of the organizations by keeping them
protected from potential lawsuits that would negatively affect the
organizations' limited resources at that time or their ability to operate
independently. For lOs, immunity was supposed to ensure their political
and financial independence and therefore their impartiality.
Since immunity of lOs came into being before the restrictive immunity
theory had been adopted by many sovereign states, it was conceived and
codified as being absolute. Many of these organizations actually have it
codified in their own constituent instruments and other international
treaties.7 It can also exist in the form of headquarters agreements, regional
agreements, and conference agreements. These treaties, due to their
international law character, are to be considered internal law of the
signatory States (at least for those in which treaty law is self-executing).
Under most of the international treaties just mentioned above, the
immunity to which 10 employees are subject is equivalent in practice to
that enjoyed by diplomatic envoys of the State Members to the
organizations (of course lOs are neither sovereign States nor are their staff
diplomatic agents of sovereign States). In this sense, they are being afforded
the same treatment that is internationally given to a State's representatives,
without actually being agents of any State. It is important to point out that
diplomatic envoys and other sovereign State civil servants are granted
immunity on the understanding that they are acting under the orders of their
States and not in their private capacity. As such, they are considered agents
7.

See, e.g., U.N. Charter art. 105.
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of their States and their actions are to be attributed to the State they are
representing. While a State has the means for controlling its diplomatic
envoys' actions and is actually responsible for them, the situation with an
1O employee is much more complex, since the organization possesses no
actual judicial means (or otherwise) of ensuring its employee's behavior
will truly represent the interests of the organization.8
A. The "FunctionalNecessity" of lOs Immunities
In the vast majority of constituent instruments of 1Os, immunity is
based on the doctrine of "functional necessity." In practice, this means that
immunity has little to do with whether an act involved "functions" or
"official duties," but rather with the fact that it must serve the proper
operation of the organization. In other words, even when the organization
or its representatives may be acting outside their functions (as for instance
in the case of sexual harassment), they still may be protected by the
"functional necessity" doctrine because removing their immunity would
hamper the 1O's capacity to perform its duties. Taking the functional
necessity doctrine as being true, we therefore assume that the organization
actually depends on its immunity for being able to function properly. This
concept challenges the classical theory on immunity, under which it is to be
considered a privilege granted on the basis of comity, which would in turn
mean that no immunity is truly necessary in the first place. This makes
functional necessity a rather interesting concept, since it seems to be
contradictory with the nature of any kind of immunity.
As a consequence of the functional necessity doctrine, the extent of the
immunity is really dependent upon the interpretation and scope given to the
The dominant interpretation has been
functional necessity doctrine.
astonishingly broad in its grant of immunity, resulting in lOs enjoying
absolute immunity, far beyond what sovereign States currently enjoy in the
world today (as Messrs. Pinochet and Milosevic would readily testify to
were they still alive).

8.
While a receiving State may generally not prosecute a diplomat from a sending State in its
own Courts for a criminal offense, it may render the offending diplomat persona non grata, requiring
the expatriation of the diplomat, and under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, the sending
State is under an obligation to trythe diplomat at home under its own laws for the alleged offense. In
the case of staff members of lOs who are afforded diplomatic immunity, even if they are made PNG and
expatriated to their home state for a criminal offense, their home state can generally not prosecute such a
staff member unless the staff member's immunity is lifted by the 10.
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B. lOs Immunity in the United States
The United States issued the International Organizations Immunities
Act (IOIA) in 1945, 9 rather than acceding to the UN Treaty on Privileges
and Immunities which was promulgated at the same time but seen by many
in the U.S. Congress as far exceeding what was necessary or acceptable for
lOs (indeed because international organizations, including the United
Nations, were not in fact sovereign States). By this act, lOs are granted
"the same immunity from suit and every form of judicial process as is
enjoyed by foreign governments."'" lOs are also afforded immunity from
search and seizure of property. As mentioned above, at the time of passing
of this Act, sovereign immunity was still absolute. Therefore, through this
Act, the United States Government codified the absolute immunity of IOs
in the United States.
However, in 1976, the restrictive theory on foreign governments'
immunities was incorporated in the United States through the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), thus limiting the immunity of foreign
States to acts dejure imperii." The so-called restrictive immunity approach
had actually been adopted by the U.S. State Department in practice
beginning in 1952.12
Nevertheless, the old absolute approach to immunity contained in the
IOIA was never updated, therefore bringing into being a differentiation
between the immunities legally enjoyed by sovereign States and those
enjoyed by lOs. In the end, regardless of the fact that 10's immunities were
in the beginning based on those afforded to foreign sovereign States, the
9.
Although still in effect and controlling the immunities of lOs operating in the United
States which are not covered by the UN Treaty on Privileges and Immunities, and having been
superseded by said UN Treaty with regard to UN entities (which was signed by the U.S. in 1945, but
never ratified and brought into legal effect in the United States until 1970, during the Nixon
Administration), IOIA required the U.S. President to nominate each 10 which was to enjoy the
immunities of the IOIA by executive order. It also provided that by similar Executive Order the U.S.
President could unilaterally lift the immunity of an 10 or its officials. International Organization
Defined; Authority ofPresident, 22 U.S.C. § 288 (1954).
10.

International Organizations Immunities Act, § 2(b), ch. 652, 59 Stat. 669 (1945).

11. Davis Graham & Stubbs LLP, A Primer on Foreign Sovereign Immunity, WORLD
SERVICES GROUP, Mar. 8, 2006, http://www.hg.orgarticles/article_1223.html (last visited Feb. 20,
2010).
12.
According to the newer or restrictive theory of sovereign immunity, the
immunity of the sovereign is recognized with regard to sovereign or public acts
(jure imperii) of a State, but not with respect to private acts (juregestionis)...
it will hereafter be the Department's policy to follow the restrictive theory of
sovereign immunity in the consideration of requests of foreign governments for
a grant of sovereign immunity.
Tate Letter, 26 DEP'T ST. BULL. 984, 984-85 (1952).
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former became much broader than the latter, creating a whole set of
complex and irreconcilable judicial situations, which will be discussed
further below.
In the United States, the combination of a liberal interpretation of
immunity regarding both the IOIA and the functional necessity doctrine has
made the question of which legal source an organization bases its immunity
on rather irrelevant, for the absolute immunity approach is enough in itself
to confer immunity upon an 10, regardless of the special provisions
contained in its constituent instrument or in any other legal source.
C. The Special Status of the UnitedNations Organization
The United Nations Organization, rightly or wrongly, holds a special
place in international law. Its immunity is very well established and is
based on two sources. The first one is the Charter of the United Nations
(UN Charter), which contains a provision regarding immunity in its Article
105 Section One, which states that it "shall enjoy in the territory of each of
its Members such privileges and immunities as are necessary for the
fulfillment of its purposes.' 13 This wording is clearly linked to the
functional necessity doctrine, which means nothing more than an
assumption of absolute immunity for the UN in the territories of all its
Member States.
The second source is the General Convention on the Privileges and
Immunities of the United Nations (General Convention), which allows the
UN to "enjoy immunity from every form of legal process except insofar as
in any particular case it has expressly waived its immunity."' 4 These two
provisions are cumulative, although the immunity granted by the UN
Charter seems to have a wider scope.
It is important to point out that the UN Charter also holds a special
place in international law, due to its Article 103, which provides that "[i]n
the event of a conflict between the obligations of the Members of the
United Nations under the present Charter and their obligations under any
other international agreement, their obligations under the present Charter
shall prevail."' 5
The UN Charter thus takes precedence over any other international
treaty of any kind. In this sense, even if the scope of the General
Convention's immunities was not narrower or equal to that under the UN

13.

U.N. Charter art. 105, § 1.

14.
General Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, art. 2, § 2, 43
AM. J. INT'L L. No.1 supp. (1949) [hereinafter General Convention].
15.

U.N. Charter art. 103.
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Charter, it would make no difference, since the Charter's Article 103 would
prevail in any case.
Regarding the means of dispute settlement, the General Convention
stipulates in its Article 8, Section 29 that "The United Nations shall make
provisions for appropriate modes of settlement of ... disputes arising out
of contracts or other16 disputes of a private law character to which the United
Nations is a party.,
The effect of this provision has been that the UN and other lOs have
implemented arbitration clauses in their purchase contracts, lease
agreements and other similar arrangements, in order to be able to solve
disputes under its own terms, preventing it from ever being subjected to any
national court.
D. Internal Dispute Settlement Mechanisms
In particular, concerning employment issues, in most 1Os, there exists
an internal dispute settlement mechanism, in the form of an administrative
tribunal or joint staff management advisory body. Employees must have
recourse to these institutions, since immunity of lOs prevents them from
being able to sue their employers before national courts.
In the early days of 1Os, there was no appeal possible to the decisions
of these mechanisms. Today the situation is somewhat different and most
organizations employ some kind of quasi-judicial forum where employees
may appeal adverse decisions. Larger organizations usually have their own,
while smaller ones may opt to use the United Nations Administrative
Tribunal (UNAT) or the International Labor Organization Administrative
Tribunal (ILOAT).

III.

IMMUNITY AS OPPOSED TO NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW

Under United States law, Constitutional provisions are superior to both
federal law and also to any 10 constituent instrument or charter (including
the UN Charter). This becomes evident when taking a look at Article VI of
the U.S. Constitution. This Article states that "[t]his Constitution, and the
Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all
Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United
States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land."17 Derived from this
provision comes the conclusion that no legal text, international or
otherwise, could possibly grant immunity in violation of the Constitution.

16.

General Convention, art. 8 § 29, 43 AM. J. INT'L L. No. I supp. (1949).

17.

U.S. CoNST. art VI.

2010]

Rios andFlaherty

The ways in which an instrument granting immunity could be held to be
unconstitutional are several and will be discussed below.
Alternatively, international law also includes notions that may be
deemed of a universal nature, which are in some cases clearly contrary to
the theories granting immunity to lOs. The clearest example comes to mind
when Human Rights law comes into play, where it becomes evident that
some types of international obligations should take precedence over others,
at least for the sake of logic and justice itself. Such cases will also be
discussed below.
A. Violation of Due Process ofLaw
10's internal dispute settlement mechanisms have been criticized for
being deficient in general and for not being able to provide an effective
remedy to employees with legal disputes in particular. As a consequence,
there arise several areas of concern regarding these tribunals or internal
advisory boards, where a case for the violation of substantive due process
could be made.
To begin with, the independence of the hearings, which constitutes an
established due process right, has been a recurrent issue of concern.
Although the administrative tribunals assert themselves to be independent
from the decision-making organs of their parent organizations in their
constituent instruments, it is precisely the defendant organizations with no
input from staff who appoint the members of the tribunals to serve for
renewable short periods of time."8 Under this scheme, it might appear that
risk of
any judge who rules against the organization is therefore running the
9
not being re-appointed for serving a second, rather lucrative term.'
Many administrative tribunals do not publish their decisions in due
time, because some of them are only made available to the public after
being collected in volumes. Further, some decisions fail to mention the
names of the judges who were sitting during the case; indeed, most litigants
before international administrative tribunals do not know the names of the
Effective 1 July 2009, the UN instituted a new so-called internal justice system which
18.
dramatically changes, at least on paper, the way in which internal staff disputes and grievances are
adjudicated. For the purposes of this paper, it is still too early to tell if the procedural changes called for
in the new system will in practice be implemented to any discernible difference, and will not be
addressed in detail herein. Press Release, Dep't of Pub. Info., Reform of United Nations Internal
Justice System, Security Management, Tsunami, U.N. Doc. GA/AB/3795 (March 30,2007).
19.
Judges in both the ILOAT and UNAT systems are paid by the case, with the judge
authoring the controlling decision paid three or four times more than his panel peers (which may explain
why there are so few dissents written in either the ILOAT or UNAT-no extra compensation is paid for
a dissent. The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-Generalon the Administration of Justice in
the Secretariat, 41, U.N. Doc. A/56/800 (Feb. 13, 2002).
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judges who will be adjudicating their appeals in advance, thereby depriving
them of the right to object to the panel composition in the event there is a
real or perceived conflict of interest with one or more of the judges. In
addition, the procedures under which the trials are held usually do not meet
minimum due process standards; 20 many administrative tribunals do not
allow for oral hearings at which witnesses may be called to testify in the
presence of their parties or their representatives. Although in the statutes of
many of these administrative tribunals there exist provisions providing for
the possibility of oral proceedings, these are rarely used. 21

20. The Redesign Panel on the United Nations System of Administration of Justice was
established by the Secretary-General of the United Nations in February 2006 pursuant to Resolution
591283, in which the General Assembly requested him to establish a panel of external, independent
experts to review and possibly redesign the system of administration of justice at the United Nations
[Press release-see http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2006/sga971.doc.htm.] The Panel included in
its membership Justice Mary Gaudron, of the International Labour Organization Administrative Tribunal
and former Judge of the Australian High Court, Ms. Louise Otis, who is an alternative dispute resolution
expert, and Dr. Ahmed EI-Kosheri, being a former Judge of the Administrative Tribunal of the African
Development Bank, ad hoe Judge of the International Court of Justice and the Vice-President of the
International Chamber of Commerce's Court of Arbitration. Press Release, The Secretary-General,
Secretary-General Appoints Independent Experts to Redesign System of Administration of Justice, U.N.
Doc. SG/A/971 (Dec. 1, 2006).
The Redesign Panel considered both the internal and external and informal and formal modes of
administration of justice within the United Nations system, which includes the UNDP. In the section
headed "Overview" the Review Panel stated:
The Redesign Panel found that the administration ofjustice in the United Nations
is neither professional nor independent. The system of administration of justice
as it currently stands is extremely slow, underresourced, inefficient and, thus,
ultimately ineffective. It fails to meet many basic standards of due process
established in international human rights instruments.
Report of the Redesign Panel on the United Nations System of Administrative Justice,
A/61/205 (July 28, 2006) (emphasis added) [hereinafter Redesign Panel].

5, U.N. Doc.

In discussing the jurisdictional immunities enjoyed by the United Nations the Review Panel
stated:
[As] a result of the jurisdictional immunities enjoyed by the Organization, staff
members have no external recourse to the legal systems of Member States, while
the Secretary-General may waive their functional immunity from action under
national legal systems in certain cases. Thus, it is essential to have an internal
justice system that both provides adequate safeguards and ensures accountability
of staff members. The Redesign Panel finds that the system that exists at present
is fundamentally inadequate for the task of administering justice.
Redesign Panel, 7, U.N. Doc. A/61/205 (July 28, 2006) (emphasis added).
The ILOAT has not held an oral argument or allowed the testimony of witnesses since
21.
1989; the UNAT has held hearings on average once every 5 years. August Reinisch & Ulf Andreas
Weber, In the Shadow of Waite and Kennedy, I INT'L ORG. L. REv. 59, 108 (2004).
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In the cases of UNAT and ILOAT, even when oral proceedings are
permitted, these may only be conducted after the approval of the President
of the tribunal, who may cast a negative vote without further explanation. It
is therefore not surprising that this kind of request is seldom approved.22
Regarding the calling of witnesses, the tribunals may arbitrarily decide to
refuse such a motion. In this context, we could cite the example of the
World Bank Administrative Tribunal, which, eleven years after its
establishment in 1981 had never allowed for the calling of witnesses in any
of the cases it had heard at that point of its existence.2 3
It is important to point out that these tribunals deal with highly
important and delicate issues, not merely "administrative" disputes as their
names may mislead us to believe. Many of the disputes being decided deal
with serious issues of harassment, personal injury to staff on duty, and
sexual assault or arbitrary or discriminatory treatment of employees by the
1Os. This is why it can be said that when dealing with these issues, the
tribunals often fall short of what would be defined as due process both by
U.S. and international law.
1. Due Process Under United States Law
The notion of due process of law is contained in the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution, stating that no person
shall "be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law.",24 These provisions therefore impose a constitutional limitation upon
the power of courts to dismiss an action without affording a party the
opportunity for a hearing on the merits of the case.
The right of access to a court of law lies on the very essence of civil
liberty. The Supreme Court has held in Powell v. Alabama that, "notice and
hearing were the preliminary steps to passing an enforceable judgment, and
that they, together with a legally competent tribunal having jurisdiction of
the case, constitute basic elements of the constitutional requirement of due
process .... ,25 Accordingly, if a court were to dismiss a complaint for lack
of jurisdiction under the argument of 10 immunity, it would therefore be
depriving the plaintiff of due process under the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments. Such an action would undoubtedly be unconstitutional.
22. For instance, from 1973 to 1985, 110 requests for oral proceedings were made before
ILOAT. Only three of these were granted. Joint Inspection Unit, Administrationof Justice at the United
Nations, 69, JIU/REP/2000/1 (2000).
23.
C.F. Amerasinghe, Judging with and Legal Advising in International Organizations,2
CHI. J. INT'L L. 283, 287 (2001).
24.

U.S. CONST. amend, V & XIV, § 1.

25.

53 S. Ct. 55, 64 (1932) (emphasis added).
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While it has been argued that the administrative tribunals of IOs
provide the plaintiffs with an available alternative forum to file their
complaints, it becomes evident from the discussion above that these fora
and their standards provide no reasonable just substitute, since they cannot
be deemed to be independent, or to meet the minimum 27
due process
26
requirements under international law or the U.S. Constitution.
2. Due Process Under International Law
The notion of due process of law has long been considered as the
fundamental basis of any reliable legal system. Internationally, it has been
codified in the most important human rights instruments, namely the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). The ICCPR states in its
Article II, Section 3 that States Parties undertake:
a)
b)

26.

To ensure that any person whose rights or freedoms are
herein recognized are violated shall have an effective
remedy ....
To ensure that any person claiming such a remedy shall
have his right thereto determined by competent judicial,
administrative or legislative authorities, or by any other

See Redesign Panel, U.N. Doc. A/61/205 (July 28, 2006).

27.
In considering the constitutionality of arbitration agreements in the employment context,
which by analogy one could argue is how the internal grievance procedures of lOs function, the U.S.
Supreme Court in Gilmer v. Interstate/JohnsonLane Corp., 111 S. Ct. 1647, 1654 (1991) set out the
minimum due process standards for alternative dispute resolution procedure (that the agreement waiving
an employee's right to litigate his claims in a national court be made knowingly and voluntarily,
knowing the background of the arbitrators and being able to challenge them to recuse themselves where
there is evident partiality or corruption, adequate discovery procedures, and open and public hearing of
the claims before the tribunal)-neither the ILOAT nor the UNAT meet these minimum standards-see
"The Non-Compliance of the ILOAT with respect to Article Six of the ECHR"; by the Amsterdam
International Law Clinic,Keith J. Webb & Arthur van Neck, The Non-Compliance of the International
Labour OrganisationAdministrative Tribunal with the Requirements of Article 6 ECHR, AILC, 1, 32
(Aug. 3, 2005) available at http://www.caioch.org/reforms/Non-complILOAT-wrtArt6-EHCR.pdf,
(last visited Jan. 20, 2010) and "The Report of the Redesign Panel on the United Nations Administration
of Internal Justice" see Redesign Panel on the United Nations System of Administrative Justice, 73,
U.N. Doc. A/61/205 (July 28, 2006). In the case of I0/UN staff members, their employment contracts
or letters of appointment never mention or explain that by joining such organizations, they are waiving
their rights to litigate any claims against their employers in a national court.
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competent authority provided for by the legal system of28
the
State, and to develop the possibilities ofjudicial remedy.
It further says in its Article XIV: "[i]n the determination of any
criminal charge against him, or of his rights and obligations in a suit at law,
everyone shall be entitled to a fair and public hearing
by a competent,
29
independent and impartial tribunal established by law.
Similar provisions can be found in the UDHR Articles 8 and 10.
Article 8 says that "[e]veryone has the right to an effective remedy by the
competent national tribunals for acts violating the fundamental rights
granted him by the constitution or by law. . .

."

Article Ten states that

"[e]veryone is entitled in full equality to a fair and public hearing by an
independent and impartial tribunal, in the determination
of his rights and
30
him.
against
charge
criminal
any
of
and
obligations
Access to a court of law as well as the notion of the right to an
effective remedy are the essential components to be found in these
provisions. The denial of such rights by the dismissal of a case on the
grounds of immunity of an 10 would therefore constitute nothing less than a
flagrant violation of the State's obligations to grant and protect these rights.
The immunity of lOs would also therefore appear to violate the
ICCPR, Article II, Section 3, to which the United States is a party, by
failing to grant the appellant an effective remedy for her damage claims
which assert several fundamental liberty interests against the defendants.3 1
Although the ICCPR is not self-executing, and although the United
States Congress has not passed any implementing legislation for the
ICCPR, the ICCPR is binding upon the United States as a signatory thereto,
which is evidenced from a straightforward reading of its Article II Section
3, quoted above. Therefore, the barring of a claim under the ICCPR (or an
equivalent right found under domestic U.S. law) by implementation of
immunity would appear to be a violation of said Article.
The ICCPR cannot be binding upon a government and contain
language invoking a remedy for individual violations and yet not infer a
domestic basis for raising this treaty as a defense to the offending
government action.32 This is true notwithstanding the U.S. Senate's
28.
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, U.N., Dec. 19, 1966, 999 TREATY
SERIES 174.
29.

Id. at 176.

30.

Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, arts. 8 & 10.

31.
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Art. 2, § 3, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 6
I.L.M. 368, 369 (Dec. 16, 1966).
32.
See United States v. Hongla-Yamache, 55 F. Supp. 2d 74, 76-77 (D. Mass., 1999) (in
which the Court recognized the right and standing of a litigant to raise an international treaty as a
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declaration announcing that the ICCPR is non-self-executing and does not
create any new private rights of action not already found in domestic United
States law.33
Moreover, if the United States had intended the non-self-executing
declaration to apply to defense claims as well as private rights of action,
Article II would negate the very purpose of the treaty as a human rights
agreement established to protect individuals within a government's
jurisdiction.3 4
It is also clear that while the ICCPR does not create any new "private
rights of action" enforceable under domestic U.S. law, such new rights of
action were not deemed necessary by the U.S. Government for it considered
that the fundamental freedoms and rights enumerated in the ICCPR were
already guaranteed as a matter of U.S. law.35
In further support of the assertion herein that the terms of Article II of
the ICCPR prevent a national court from invoking the immunity of an 1O
bar an appellant's tort or contract claims. Soon after its adoption, the U.S.
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations declared the ICCPR to be non-self-

defense to violations of the treaty even when the treaty was not self-executing (in that case, the Vienna
Convention on Consular Relations)).
33. Beyond the general declaration of the Senate that the ICCPR is non-self-executing, the
U.S. government has not declared an understanding or reservation to Article Two of the ICCPR.
34. See U.N. GAOR, Human Rights Committee, 52nd Sess., 1382nd mtg. at 4, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/21/Rev.I/Add. 6 (Nov. 11, 1994) (stating that the purpose of the ICCPR is "that rights
contained therein should be ensured to all those under a state party's jurisdiction").
35.

In its Initial Report to the Human Rights Committee on the ICCPR, the United States

stated:
This declaration [that Articles 1 through 27 are not self-executing] did not limit
the international obligations of the United States under the Covenant. Rather, it
means that, as a matter of domestic law, the Covenant does not, by itself, create
private rights directly enforceable in U.S. courts. As indicated throughout this
report, however, the fundamental rights and freedoms protected by the Covenant
are already guaranteed as a matter of U.S. law, either by virtue of constitutional
protections or enacted statutes, and can be effectively asserted and enforced by
individuals in the judicial system on those bases. For this reason it was not
considered necessary to adopt special implementing legislation to give effect to
the Covenant's provisions in domestic law. In some cases, it was considered
necessary to take a substantive reservation to specific provisions of the Covenant,
or to clarify the interpretation given to a provision through the adoption of an
understanding.
Initial Reports of State Parties due in 1993: United States of America, CCPR/C/8 1/Add.4, (Aug.
24, 1994); see also United States: Senate Committee on Foreign Relations Report on the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, May 1992, 31 I.L.M. 645, 645, reproduced from U.S. Senate
Executive Report 102-23 (102d Cong., 2d Sess.).
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executing only with respect "to private causes of action"--it does not
contain the same statement with regard to raising the ICCPR as a defense.36
A private cause of action is not the same thing as a defense. A recent
U.S. District Court decision essentially accepted the distinction between a
"private right of action" and a defense raised for the purpose of determining
whether the ICCPR itself was self-executing.3 7 In a number of older cases
where a treaty is raised as a defense rather than as a private cause of action,
the United States courts have generally not reached the issue as to whether
or not the treaty is self-executing, but rather address whether the defense is
valid under the subject treaty, irrespective of the treaty's non-self-executing
nature.38
Again, more recently, a U.S. District Court reached the merits of a
claim without discussing the non-self-executing nature of the ICCPR,
where the defendants, who were accused of assaulting several Drug
Enforcement Administration agents, raised the ICCPR as a defense to the
assault indictment. The court accepted the defense without addressing the
issue of self-execution, and proceeded to the merits of the defense, thereby
implicitly accepting the application of the ICCPR when used as a defense.39
Finally, the Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the
United States, Section I 11, Reporter's Note five, states that negative treaty
provisions (such as those found in Article II of the ICCPR) are selfexecuting (quoting Commonwealth v. Hawes),40 and therefore,
implementation language is not necessary: "[If a treaty states] that certain
acts shall not be done, or that certain limitations or restrictions shall not be
disregarded or exceeded by the contracting parties, the compact does not
need to be supplemented by legislative or executive action, to authorize the
courts of justice to decline to override these limitations or to exceed the
prescribed restrictions, for the palpable and all-sufficient reason, that to do
so would be not only to violate the public faith, but to transgress the
'supreme law of the land. '"

36. See United States: Senate Committee on Foreign Relations Report on the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, May 1992, 31 I.L.M. 645, 657, reproducedfrom U.S. Senate
Executive Report 102-23 (102d Cong., 2d Sess.).
37.

Ralk v. Lincoln County, 81 F. Supp. 2d 1372, 1380 (S.D. Ga. 2000).

38.
See Kolovrat v. Oregon, 81 S. Ct. 922, 925 (1961); Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. 102,
121-22 (1933); Pastone v. Pennsylvania, 232 U.S. 138, 145-46 (1914); and United States v. Rauscher,
119 U.S. 407,420 (1886).
39.

United States v. Benitez, 28 F. Supp. 1361, 1363-64 (S.D. Fla. 1998).

40.

76 Ky. 697, 702-03 (1878)

41.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, § I11,

n.5 (1986).

448

ILSA JournalofInternational& ComparativeLaw

[Vol. 16:2

As mentioned before, the case with the UN is particular, since some
have argued its Charter takes precedence over any other international
obligation of the State in question.42 At first glance it would seem that
States would be obliged to give precedence to Article 105 of the Charter,
therefore granting immunity to the organization. Nevertheless, the same
UN Charter also contains provisions such as its Articles 55 and 56, by
which the Member States undertake to promote the universal respect and
observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms. As a consequence,
Member States of the UN would also have a positive duty to enforce the
UN Charter's human rights obligations over and above any other
international law granting immunity, which actually makes more sense both
in law and in fact than upholding the lOs immunity defense before a
national court.
In the case of all other 1Os, since there is no provision granting their
constituent instruments precedent over any other treaty, it could be more
easily argued that their obligations under the human rights conventions as
well as under customary international law are to be sustained and defended
before any other obligation the States may have contracted.
Interestingly, until the passage of the International Organization
Immunities Act (IOIA) in 1945, 43 the U.S. government had consistently
taken the position that there was no basis in the U.S. law or treaties or in
customary international law to extend the privileges and immunities of
foreign diplomats to personnel of international organizations. 44 Even with
the passage of the IOIA, the Senate believed this to be the controlling
interpretation of the IOA: "It should be noted that under this . . .(Act)
there would not be extended full diplomatic
immunity from judicial process
'45
as in the case of diplomatic officers.
As absolute foreign sovereign immunity has been repudiated by
virtually all other countries, and as judicial scrutiny of the conduct of States
has been expanded in both domestic and foreign courts, it is not clear why
lOs should need to be presumptively exempted from similar review. There
is no compelling jurisprudential or policy reason why a collection of States

42.

This is certainly not an accepted view in the United States where the U.S. Constitution is

seen as the supreme law of the land.
43.

International Organization Defined; Authority of President, 22 U.S.C. § 288 (1954).

44.

Lawrence Preuss, The InternationalOrganizationImmunities Act, 40 AM. J. INT'L L. 332,

333 (1946).
45.
U.S. Senate, Committee on Finance, Report on Immunities for International Organizations,
S. Rep. N*. 861, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. (1945) reprinted in the U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign
Relations, Subcommittee on the UN Charter, Review of the UN Charter, Senate Doc. N0 . 87, 83rd
Cong., 1st Sess., 88, 92 (1954).
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acting through an international organization should require substantially
broader immunity than its Member States enjoy when they act alone.
States may not evade their international obligations by acting through
international organizations granting them broader immunities than their
Member States enjoy, lest that create perverse incentives for Member
Countries to use them to circumvent their own obligations. 46
The argument that 1Os and their officials need expansive immunities to
achieve their organizational purposes also overlooks the current size,
Expansive
stature, and influence of many of these institutions.
jurisdictional immunity arguably may have been a functional requirement
over a half century ago, when these organizations were fledgling entities.
But this is not the case today. The most prominent 1Os are now wellfunded and firmly established, and have considerable legal and political
resources at their disposal to defend their independence and organizational
prerogatives. In fact, the power and influence of the more prominent
organizations have expanded to the point where they are largely insulated
from overreaching by most of their Members States.
B. Denial of the Right to Petitionthe Governmentfor Redress of
Grievances
The United States Supreme Court has been of the opinion that the right
to petition the Government for redress of grievances 47is "among the most
precious of liberties safeguarded by the Bill of Rights.'
The right of petition for redress of grievances (which has been found
by the Supreme Court to include the act of bringing a lawsuit) envisaged by
the U.S. Constitution and case law would be nullified if the Government
could simply prevent their assertion or vindication by immunizing certain
non-governmental defendants (such as the UN or 1Os) from being sued
before its courts.
C. Violation to the Right to a Trial by Jury
Under the Seventh Amendment, the U.S. Constitution grants its
citizens the right of trial by jury. As with the previous Amendments
discussed, in granting immunity from suit to certain kind of defendants, the
Government would be violating this constitutional provision and therefore
depriving the plaintiff of his right to a trial by jury.

46.
Matthews v. United Kingdom, ECHR Application No. 24833/94, Judgment of 18 February
1999, para. 32 (European Convention on Human Rights does not exclude the transfer of competences to
international organizations provided that states continue to "secure" Convention rights).
47.

United Mine Workers v. Illinois State Bar Ass'n, 88 S.Ct. 353, 356 (1967).
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Even so, it is common for courts both in the United States and
elsewhere to hold that 10 immunities are indeed absolute and are to be
sustained as a defense on the admissibility of the case, therefore not even
granting a review on the merits of the case by the court.

IV. ALTERNATIVES TO ABSOLUTE IMMUNITY
Under the current regime of immunity afforded to 1Os by most
national courts, it seems therefore that plaintiffs are left with no available
remedy for addressing their injuries resulting from tortious conduct or
breach of contracts. This is precisely why the absolute immunity theory
does not correspond to today's realities, and why alternatives are very much
needed. In this sense, there are a number of real and practical ways in
which absolute immunity could be transformed into a scheme where the
plaintiff's rights are also respected.
A. FunctionalImmunity as an Affirmative Defense to be PleadedRather
than an Absolute Bar
As discussed above, State courts normally apply the absolute
immunity theory as a bar on the admissibility of a case, rather than
requiring that immunity be raised as a defense on the merits. As a
consequence, most cases are dismissed without giving the plaintiffs a
chance to plead the facts of the case before the court, or to otherwise argue
that the conduct complained of is neither necessary to the functioning of the
10 nor part of the 10's treaty mandate.
An alternative to this practice, which would actually be in line with
many national constitutional provisions, would be for courts to adopt the
"functional immunity" approach as a defense on the merits, to be pleaded
by the 10 once the court has affirmed jurisdiction on the case. In this way,
it would be for the 10 to convince the court that being sued in that specific
case would hamper the correct functioning of the organization and therefore
its immunity should be preserved in the case at hand. In this regard, some
kind of test could be developed through case law, in order to determine in
which cases and under which conditions immunity could be upheld. It is
necessary to mention that under this scenario, the only cases in which
immunity could remain would be those in which it proved absolutely
necessary for the 10 to be immune from prosecution in order to continue
carrying out the mandate for which it was created.
Of course, devising a methodology to distinguish the worthy actions of
1Os which deserve immunity is no mean feat. The authors would suggest
that the system currently employed in the United States to circumvent
sovereign immunity (actions under Section 1983 of the United States
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Federal Code,'4 so-called Bivens actions, 49 and the Federal Tort Claims

Act) would be the starting point for such a comprehensive model.
In this manner, courts would ensure the proper application of
functional immunities on a case-by-case basis, and plaintiffs would get a
chance to have the facts of their cases heard before a neutral court, in
accordance with their fundamental right guarantees.
Applying functional immunity in its true form-that is, when
immunity is truly justified by the Organization's necessity of carrying out
its functions for the common good-would actually bring to an end the
incorrect prevailing assumption today that functional immunity has to be
equivalent to absolute immunity.

48.
The Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1996), was originally enacted a few years after the U.S. Civil
War. One of the chief reasons for its passage was to protect southern blacks from the KKK by providing
a civil remedy for abuses then being committed in the South. The statute has been subject to only minor
changes since then, but has been the subject of voluminous interpretation by courts. It provides:
Every person who under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to
be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an
action at law, Suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, except that in
any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such
officer's judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a
declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable. For the
purposes of this section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the
District of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of the District of
Columbia.
For most of its history, the Act had very little effect. The legal community did not think the
statute served as a check on state officials, and did not often litigate under the statute. However, this
changed in 1961 when the US Supreme Court decided Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 170, 171 (1961),
reopening interest in the statute. Now the statute stands as one of the most powerful authorities with
which U.S. State and federal courts may protect those whose rights are deprived.
49.
The US Supreme Court laid down a rule that it will imply a private right of action for
monetary damages where no other federal remedy is provided for the vindication of a Constitutional
right, based on the principle that for 'every wrong, there is a remedy'. The Court reasoned based upon a
presumption that where there is a violation of a right, the plaintiff can recover whatever he could recover
under any civil action, unless Congress has expressly curtailed that right of recovery, or there exist some
"special factor counseling hesitation." Bivens v. Six Unknown Names Agents of Federal Bureau of
Narcotics, 91 S. Ct. 1999, 2005 (1971).
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B. Creationof Specialized Courts to Deal with the Claims oflO Staff
Members and Third PartiesInjured by the Tortious Behavior or
ContractualBreach by an 10
The creation of independent, specialized courts to deal with specific
disputes, is not precisely new. Perhaps the most evident example is the
Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal, which was "established for the purpose of
deciding claims of nationals of the United States against Iran and claims of
nationals of Iran against the United States," 50 as a response to the disputes
that had arisen during the 1979 Iranian Revolution. The tribunal was
indeed conceived as a permanent forum for conducting binding third-party
arbitration, avoiding in that way the issue of sovereign immunity of both
States.
A similar scheme could be devised with the purpose of solving certain
types of disputes involving 1Os, in which a forum with permanent standing
would have jurisdiction to hear the cases and to give binding judgments. In
this manner, the immunity of the lOs would no longer be a bar to
adjudicating the case, since they would be considered to have expressly
waived them by creating such a forum. Of course, ensuring that such
specialized courts were truly independent from the Members States and lOs
is a huge burden to be overcome.
C. True Independent Arbitration
Along the same line as the previous proposal, truly independent
arbitration proceedings could be entered in order to solve disputes between
lOs and private individuals. Instead of having a permanent forum to hear
these cases, ad hoc arbitral tribunals could be established on a case-by-case
basis to render binding awards on specific disputes.
The key issue with this system is that both parties would appoint
independent arbitrators to decide the case, unlike the existent internal fora,
in which judges are chosen by the same lOs against whom the cases are
presented. By nominating arbitrators, their impartiality would be
guaranteed and therefore the system of justice administration would not be
compromised as it is nowadays.

50.
Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, Declaration of the Government of the Democratic and
Popular Republic of Algeria Concerning the Settlement of Claims by the Government of the United
States of America and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, art. 2 (1) (Jan. 19, 1981),
available at http./www.iusct.org/ (last visited Mar. 10, 2010).
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D. Qui Tam for lOs
In the United States, the notion of qui tam has been codified in the
U.S. Federal Fraud Claims Act. If, following this example, lOs were to
implement a similar provision allowing their employees to report fraud
within the Organization, and to receive a part of the amounts recovered as a
result of their reporting, cases of fraud and mismanagement could be
addressed through this legal avenue. In this sense, employees would be
encouraged on one hand, to avoid being involved in these situations, and on
the other hand, would demand from the 10 clean processes and truly
competent fora to hear these complaints.
E. Reform Through Litigation
Reforming 10's constituent instruments has proven one of the most
difficult tasks on the international agenda. It is no secret that, for instance,
the UN Charter has only been formally amended with regards to the number
of Member States in its organs. Every single other reform that the UN has
gone through has had to be done through the practice of the organization
rather than by statutory reform. Following this line of thought, even if the
UN Charter's Article 105 would be almost impossible to amend, it could be
transformed-although not literally reformed-through a series of judicial
decisions, rendered before several national courts, in which the provisions
related to immunity would be interpreted in a restrictive way, contrary to
the absolute approach that still persists. One of the authors currently has
two cases pending before the U.S. Federal Court of Appeals for the second
Circuit in which the constitutionality of the immunities of the United
Nations and the World Meteorological Organization under United States
law are at issue.5'
F. Reducing Absolute Immunity Through Statutory Measures
In the United States, absolute governmental immunity no longer exists.
It has been reduced by the introduction of various statutory measures (such
as the U.S. Code Section 1983, so-called Bivens actions, and the Federal
Tort Claims Act). On the contrary, as has been evidenced above, the
immunity of 1Os remains absolute, with no real (or even functional)
justification anymore. In the same manner that sovereign immunities and
0
51.
Brzak v. United Nations, Annan, Lubbers et aL Docket N 08cv2799, and Veiga v. World
Meteorological Organisation, Jarraud, et al. Docket N*. 08cv3999. The cases were argued in May 2009,
and judgment in one is still pending. In Brzak the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
dismissed the claim on March 2, 2010, however, the plaintiffs intend to seek relief from the United
States Supreme Court.
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privileges have been limited by these acts, statutory measures restricting the
immunity of 1Os before national courts could be implemented in order to
set limits on these, although that does not seem likely to happen anytime
soon.
V. CONCLUSIONS

The notion of sovereign immunity dates back several centuries. It was
brought into being in an epoch in which monarchs enjoyed absolute power
to do as they pleased and could not be restrained by others except generally
by force. The constant change of the international scenario has forced
sovereigns to adapt to new conditions, in which there are monarchs no more
and sovereign immunity, although still present, has at least been somewhat
restricted.
The immunities and privileges first granted to International
Organizations were intended to aid them into correctly evolving and taking
their place in the international arena. This function can nowadays be said to
have been more than fully accomplished-International Organizations are
properly established and therefore do not need this excessive protection
anymore.
Quite to the contrary, it could be argued that the present situation calls
for a further process of evolution of lOs immunities, since this scheme no
longer fits the current needs of the international community. It could even
be said that the asserted immunities arguably have a contrary effect-rather
than encouraging the good governance of 1Os, they enable unethical, illegal
and sometimes criminal behavior that as a result of such immunities goes
unpunished and often remains unreformed. The repeated and unabated
sexual abuse of refugee girls by 10 aid workers and UN peacekeepers over
the past decade (despite the UN's pitiful so-called "zero tolerance" policy
for such atrocities) is a prime example.
Sovereign States and their leaders under current doctrines of
jurisdictional immunity, although somewhat free to brutalize whom they
please within their own territory, with little fear of accountability for such
impunity, still must be concerned about the International Criminal Court,
the UN Security Council, as well as extra-territorial tort claim statutes such
as the U.S. Alien Tort Claims Act. It would indeed be a grave mistake to
send the lOs and their officials the message that they can now enjoy the
same freedom to act with impunity within their own sphere, particularly as
some 10 staff will and indeed have developed a sense of being above the
law.
Immunities may at first glance seem beneficial to the UN and other
international organizations but may ultimately prove counterproductive.
One should consider that the vast immunities of these organizations will
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give the impression that they can get away with abusing the very principles
for which they were created to promote.
It is more than evident that limiting of 1Os immunities would only
serve the proper administration of justice. If immunities were to be
conceived under a system where, for instance, 1Os could retain their
immunity so long as their actions were deemed to be consistent with their
functional necessity doctrine as determined by some national court or
another truly independent body, the organization's functions would not be
affected by unfounded lawsuits, but at the same time, national and
international law would always be respected. This is of particular
importance in the case of human rights law and constitutional provisions, as
mentioned earlier.
In closing, the authors wish for the reader to consider the following
quotations which aptly summarize the pressing rationale for eliminating the
absolute immunity currently enjoyed by lOs which serve simply as an
impediment to the long-overdue meaningful reform of such entities:
"No man is above the law and no man is below it; nor do we ask any
man's permission when we require him to obey it. Obedience to the law is
demanded as a right; not asked as a favor." U.S. President Theodore
Roosevelt.
"When plunder becomes a way of life for a group of men living
together in society, they create for themselves in the course of time a legal
system that authorizes it and a moral code that glorifies it." Frederic
Bastiat, 'The Law'. ,52

52.
Rodrigue Tremblay, The Moral Dimension of Things, DIsSIDENT VOICE, Mar. 6, 2010,
http://dissidentvoice.org/2010/03/the-moral-dimension-of-things/ (last visited Mar. 13, 2010).

